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IN THE UTAH COUR 
PROVO ci r,, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee 
vs. 
BHDin '• iMiMMi.K. 
Defend.i'i! ' '\p|M'i|;int 
Case No. 20030260-CA 
BRIEF t»! * 
L bKUM IHE FOURTH JUDICIAL DIS I Kl< I COl JR'I, t ,Ui COl INTY, 
PROVO DEPARTMENT, FROM A C'ONVIi 1 ION OF DRIVING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS, A CLASS B MISDF.MEANUk, 
BEFORE THE HONORART.FHTTV r MUKNiNGHAM 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COITH \ Hi \ I'l'f * i , 
' h i t . ourl has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provision1* • • i 
Utah Code Annotate! * 7^ J.i H>'> 
ISSUES PRESENTFJ M\h\Hl \V 
1. Whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain Kumnu mm lor di i\ \\\\i 
'When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, 
we [Appellate Court] "r«ont unless it is against the clear 
weight of the evidence, or if the app^ ' " . I; , . . . , , d l l u i i i ' m 
conviction that a mistake has been made." State v. Nichols, 2003 UT App 287, f 24 ,76 
P.3d 1173 ( quoting State v. Larsen, 2000 Ut App 106, U 10, 999 P.2d 1252). 
2. Whether appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel when his attorney 
did not move for dismissal at the conclusion of the City's case in chief? 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of the Utah Code Annotated Section 41-6-44 is set forth in Appellee's 
Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On or about November 7, 2002, Kummer was charged by information with driving 
under the influence of drugs, a Class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44 and an unsafe lane change, a Class C misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-61. On December 5, 2002, at an arraignment hearing before Judge Guy 
Burningham of the Fourth District Court, Kummer entered not guilty pleas to both the 
above charges and a pretrial conference date was set for January 16, 2003. At that time 
the trial court also found Kummer to be indigent and appointed a public defender to 
represent him. 
On February 24, 2003, at a bench trial before Judge Guy Burningham of the Fourth 
District Court, Kummer was found guilty on both counts and sentencing was set on 
March 3, 2003. On March 3, 2003, based on the conviction of driving under the influence 
of drugs the defendant was sentenced to a term of thirty days in the Utah County jail with 
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a total time of twenty-eight days suspended. Kumnwr w .is .il< nnleml in |M(V J tuL"I line 
ol 1) 13!) J. Mi) on both counts and placed on probation for eighteen months. 
( . immer and his previous counsel filed a Notice of Appeal • 
along Willi a Motion ibi i •' * * ; -. < * .e entry of judgment 
pending the appeal. On March 20, 2003, Pro\u ^ity nice r;mdum m "! kpposuion 
to Defendant's Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause, On April 21, 2003, after oral 
arpunirnf; wrrr In iii I ii ' tiimi iiuii gianicd tin: Lcrtilicate of Probable Cause staying the 
imposition of Kummer's sentence nondmi' ihr r>nk ^  -iiii I iiij JM .J 
On April 29, 2003, the previous counsel for Kummer f !* / 
J1- ("' MIIISCI ttiid Iii Appotnl Alternate Counsel, On May 27, 2003, the Fourth District Court 
approved the Mnlnm JIM! iippnmlod < uiu.-ul rounsel (o represent Kummer.' 
STATEMEN i OF RE I ,¥X A NT l«'AC i"! i 
\ hi Novembci f "002, Sergeant Deke Taylor of the Utah Coun- ^u - •' ' ' '^ ; 
> mouth iisaKv. aa improper right turn onto 500 West, Pro\ u. I ho 
turn was so wide : .M*. *ane as well as into the 
inside lane to a da iee that the car was partially in tlir pninh*H h-;l ml, m IIM i/oik r 
sliaddling Uic line, (R.77 at 4-8). Thereafter, Sergeant Taylor saw the same vehicle 
weaving in -tiul mil nl ilie inside lane over the center line into the painted island referred 
to as a turn lane. (R.77 at 8), Sergeant T • <>, i"« snipped "IK. (iin k1 using his overhead red 
and blue lights on his vehicle. (R.77 at [>j. 
•nil, 
Sergeant Taylor approached the driver of the vehicle and recognized the driver as 
Buddy Kummer from previous encounters. Sergeant Taylor identified Kummer by his 
Utah driver's license. (R.77 at 11). Sergeant Taylor noted that Kummer's speech was 
rapid and his voice was somewhat raspy. Sergeant Taylor acknowledged that Kummer 
talks with a raspy voice normally. Sergeant Taylor also observed that Kummer had a hard 
time paying attention and that he (Taylor) had to make several requests of Kummer to see 
Kummer's driver's license, registration, and insurance. At the same time, Sergeant 
Taylor saw that Kummer was having a hard time keeping his eyes open, as if he was tired, 
and that his eyelids were droopy. (R.77 at 11-12). 
Sergeant Taylor had Kummer get out of the vehicle so he could administer field 
sobriety tests. (R.77 at 12). The day was sunny and it was about 11:43 a.m. The tests 
were administered on a flat concrete sidewalk. (R.77 at 24). Sergeant Taylor is a certified 
drug recognition expert (DRE) through the Drug Evaluation Classification Program 
sponsored by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (R.77 at 13). Sergeant 
Taylor testified that all of the field sobriety tests administered to Kummer were 
standardized tests recognized by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and 
by the International Association of Chiefs of Police that govern the DRE program. (R.77 
at 50). 
Sergeant Taylor explained that the purpose of the field sobriety tests is to test a 
person's ability to divide their attention between a mental and physical task. This is 
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important when driving because driving requires dividing attention between numerous 
complex tasks. (R.77 at 18). 
Prior to administering field sobriety tests to Kummer, Sergeant Taylor specifically 
asked Kummer if he had problems that would affect his ability to walk on a line in a 
prescribed manner, and to stand on one foot. (R.77 at 19-20). Kummer stated to Sergeant 
Taylor that he had a spinal cord problem and therefore the tests requiring walking or 
standing on one foot were not administered to Kummer. (R.77 at 20). Sergeant Taylor 
asked Kummer if he would have a problem standing with his feet together and his hands 
by his sides with his head back and his eyes closed. Kummer replied that he could do that. 
(R.77 at 56, 82). 
Sergeant Taylor administered the Romberg balance test which required Kummer to 
stand with both feet together with his hands by his sides, to tilt his head back, close his 
eyes, and then estimate the passage of 30 seconds. (R.77 at 20-21). Sergeant Taylor 
testified that Kummer swayed six to eight inches circularly and front to back, as well as 
side to side, and that he estimated thirty seconds at eleven actual seconds which Sergeant 
Taylor timed with his watch. (R.77 at 22). Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer's 
performance on the Romberg balance test was poor and he felt that Kummer's balance 
was impaired and there was a definite problem with his perception of time. (R.77at 22). 
Sergeant Taylor then administered the modified fmger-to-nose test to Kummer. 
Kummer was instructed to stand with his feet together with his hands by his sides, making 
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fists with both hands, and turning his palms towards Sergeant Taylor or outward from 
him. He was also instructed to extend his index fingers keeping his elbows to his sides, 
to tilt his head back and close his eyes. Kummer was given a sequence of commands and 
was instructed to reach with his left hand and touch the tip of his left finger to the tip of 
his nose and then return it to his side. (R.77 at 23-24). Sergeant Taylor demonstrated the 
test for Kummer prior to administering it. (R.77 at 25). Sergeant Taylor testified that 
Kummer missed his nose, basically touching his face in different locations other than his 
nose on five of the six different attempts that he made, and that he was swaying during 
the administration of the test as well. Sergeant Taylor stated that Kummer failed the test 
due to the fact that five out six times he did not properly touch his nose as he was 
instructed.(R.77 at 25). 
Sergeant Taylor administered two more field sobriety tests to Kummer, the hand 
slap and finger count test. (R.77 at 25-28). Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer failed 
the hand slap test by double and triple slapping on one side instead of slapping palm to 
back and not properly coordinating slapping with counting as he was instructed. (R.77 at 
26). Also, Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer failed the finger count test by not 
properly coordinating the touching of his fingers with his thumb when counting. Kummer 
also did not touch the fingers in the proper sequences as instructed, indicating a problem 
with his dexterity as well. (R.77 at 28). 
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Sergeant Taylor proceeded to administer a horizontal gaze nystagmus test to 
Kummer and testified that he failed the test and had all the clues present for drug use. In 
addition, nystagmus was distinct in both eyes, which was consistent with what Kummer 
had told Sergeant Taylor he had taken. (R.77 at 28-30). 
Sergeant Taylor testified that after administering all the field sobriety tests he felt 
that Kummer was impaired to the degree that he could not safely operate a vehicle and 
placed Kummer under arrest for driving under the influence. (R.77-30). 
Sergeant Taylor reiterated that he based the arrest of Kummer on his initial driving 
pattern, his appearance of having droopy eyelids, his appearing tired, Kummer's inability 
to properly perform simple field sobriety tests, his impaired ability to stand, his impaired 
coordination, and his impaired dexterity. (R.77 at 30-31,43). Sergeant Taylor testified 
that all of these facts in combination with Kummer's appearance were consistent with 
somebody under the influence of central nervous system (CNS) depressant types of drugs. 
Lortab and Soma are catagorized as those types of drugs. (R.77 at 43-44). 
Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer was handcuffed and transported to the Utah 
County jail. Sergeant Taylor testified that while transporting Kummer to the Utah County 
jail Kummer had droopy eyelids and was "on the nod." Sergeant Taylor describes that 
condition as being asleep, though not totally unconscious, and still being able to interact 
with others. (R.77 at 31-32). 
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Sergeant Taylor testified that during the field sobriety tests and in the car that 
Kummer told him he had taken Lortab for which he had a prescription. (R.77 at 32-33). 
Sergeant Taylor also testified that while Kummer was being asked standard DUI 
questions at the jail, after being advised of his Miranda rights and waiving his rights, 
Kummer told him that he had taken Lortab and Soma at approximately 8:00 a.m. (R.77 at 
34-35). 
Sergeant Taylor testified during the trial that Kummer's physiological condition 
was consistent with having taken both Lortab and Soma. Sergeant Taylor testified that 
Lortab is a narcotic analgesic and pain killer that has central nervous system depressant 
effects. He further testified that Lortab depresses the activity of the brain and of the 
central nervous system, causing people to slow down, appear asleep, and appear tired. He 
stated also that Lortab has an analgesic effect which is a pain-deadening effect. (R.77 at 
36). 
Sergeant Taylor testified the drug Soma is a controlled drug but is not a scheduled 
drug and is a central nervous system depressant and is considered a muscle relaxant. 
Taylor testified that Soma, when mixed with drugs with similar effects, can have a 
compounding effect on the way it impacts a person's coordination.(R.77 at 37). Sergeant 
Taylor further testified that if a person was to take a therapeutic dose of Lortab he may or 
may not be impaired. But he also testified that Soma and Lortab taken together could 
have a compounding effect. (R.77 at 37). Sergeant Taylor also testified that the two drugs 
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together will cause a compound effect upon a person's ability to divide their attention 
between a mental and physical task. Taylor also mentioned this compound effect on 
pulse, blood pressure, dexterity, and coordination, all of which potentially have an impact 
on driving and which slow down one's ability to react. (R.77 at 42). 
Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer refused to be cooperative with a DRE 
exam. Kummer refused to provide a blood test, a urine test, pulse, blood pressure, 
temperature, and a closer look at his eyes. (R.77 at 44). 
Sergeant Taylor acknowledged that there are individuals for whatever reason that 
would have a problem performing the Romberg balance test and that therefore he 
administers different physical tests beyond the horizontal gaze nystagmus to give them 
the benefit of the doubt. (R.77 at 51). 
Sergeant Taylor stated in response to questioning about the duration of effects for 
Lortab and Soma in combination is generally four to six hours and that he obtained this 
information from a Physicians Desk Reference and other medical and 
pharmacological texts. (R.77 at 53). Taylor also testified that he had never encountered a 
situation where a physician who had prescribed Lortab and Soma in combination for a 
patient had then encouraged that patient to thereafter drive. (R.77 at 54). 
Sergeant Taylor testified that prescriptions for narcotic analgesics and central 
nervous system depressants come with warning stickers on the bottle that encourage 
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people not to drive or use heavy machinery because the medication could cause 
drowsiness. (R.77 at 54). 
Sergeant Taylor acknowledged that he had not seen valid prescription bottles for 
Lortab or Soma for Kummer that would have warning stickers for driving , operation of 
heavy machinery, drowsiness or other effects. (R77 at 54-55). 
During the trial, the defense counsel called witness Jack Powell to testify, who was 
a passenger in Kummer's vehicle on the morning on November 5, 2002. (R.77 at 58). 
Powell stated that he was also present when Kummer took his Lortab and Soma together 
at approximately 8:00 a.m. (R.77 at 58-59). Powell stated that Kummer drove him around 
for a couple of hours and then dropped him off at the Hotel Roberts at 10:00 a.m. (R.77 at 
59). Powell testified that he did not notice anything peculiar about Kummer's driving. 
(R.77 at 59). Powell also testified that he did not notice any indicators that Kummer was 
impaired, driving unsafely, or speaking differently than he normally does. (R.77 at 60). 
Powell testified that he does not have specialized training in the detection of individuals 
who are under the influence of alcohol or drugs and would not know what clues to look 
for. (R.77 at 61-62). 
During trial, Kummer took the stand and testified that he did not cross the line as 
testified by Sergeant Taylor. (R.77 at 68). Kummer testified that he saw Sergeant Taylor 
make a u-turn and he could see the sergeant in his rear view mirror. Kummer stated that 
he had previous encounters with the Sheriffs office and he was nervous. (R.77 at 68). 
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Kummer testified that he was watching Sergeant Taylor from his rearview mirror and he 
was getting nervous. (R.77 at 65,68). 
Kummer testified that Sergeant Taylor accused him of being on methamphetamine 
and that he told Sergeant Taylor that he had taken Lortab and Soma and that he had been 
taking them for ten years. Kummer asked Sergeant Taylor to verify this with his doctor. 
(R.77 at 69). Kummer also testified that on the day in question that he had taken one of 
each pill in the morning. (R.77 at 71). Kummer further testified that when he started 
taking the pills he was instructed not to drive for a while. (R.77 at 71). Kummer testified 
that when he was being driven to jail that he was nervous and scared of Sergeant Taylor's 
driving because Kummer was previously in a wreck on the highway. Kummer stated that 
he told Sergeant Taylor that he could not do the tests being administered to him because 
of a spinal cord and neck injury and that Sergeant Taylor would not call his doctor to 
confirm his condition. (R.77 at 72-73). Kummer stated that he would not submit to a 
blood test with his doctor because all his veins in his arms were gone and they have to 
draw blood from his jugular vein or in another vein in an area that he will not let people 
touch. (R.77 at 75). 
Under cross examination, Kummer testified that making really wide turns 
represents his normal driving pattern and that he did not know if he was weaving or not 
because he was watching the sergeant in his rear view mirror. (R.77 at 76-77). 
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Kummer confirmed that Sergeant Taylor asked him if he had physical problems 
that would prohibit him from performing field sobriety tests satisfactorily and that 
Kummer told Sergeant Taylor what his problems were. (R.77 at 78). 
At the conclusion of the trial and after arguments by counsel, the court found 
Kummer guilty of the improper lane change and driving under the influence of drugs 
based on the uncontroverted evidence that Kummer did take both Soma and Lortab on the 
morning of November 5, 2002, at least and probably within about three to three and one-
half hours of when he was stopped, based on his performance on field sobriety tests, and 
based on his driving pattern, evidencing impairment, causing it to be unsafe for him to be 
operating a vehicle while taking Soma and Lortab. (R.77 at 88-91). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Provo City asserts that based on the quantum of evidence concerning each element 
of the crime there was sufficient evidence that Kummer was guilty of violating Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii), operating a motor vehicle while under the influence, beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Therefore, Kummer's defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to 
make a motion to dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
KUMMER'S CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF DRUGS WAS SUPPORTED BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
THEREFORE, KUMMER'S DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NOT MOVING TO 
DISMISS THE CHARGE. THE TRIAL COURT'S VERDICT IS NOT 
AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE 
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A. Rummer's conviction is supported by sufficient evidence for each 
element of the crime 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the 
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reached a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 Ut App 61, % 5, 975 P.2d 501 (quoting State v. 
Layman, 953 P.2d 782,786 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). "However, before we can uphold a 
conviction it must be supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the 
crime as charged from which the [fact finder] may base its conclusion of guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt "Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 Ut App 61, t 5, 975 P.2d 501 
(quoting State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d 399,402 (Utah 1980)). 
"When reviewing a defendant's challenge to his or her conviction based on a claim 
of insufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the evidence presented at trial." State v. 
Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, f t , 38 P.3d 982 (quoting State v. Goodman,, 763 P.2d 
786, 786-87 (Utah 1988)). When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, 
we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence'.... This standard requires that the clear weight of the evidence presented at 
trial not be contrary to the verdict." " State v. Andreason, 2001 UT App 395, \A , 38 P.3d 
982 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ] 42, 994 P.2d 177). 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) states that "(a) [a] person may not operate or 
be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person: (ii) is under the 
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influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a 
degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle." 
A review of all of the evidence shows that Kummer consumed a prescribed 
amount of Lortab and Soma approximately three and one-half hours before being stopped 
by Sergeant Taylor and that the combined effects of these drugs rendered him incapable 
of safely operating a motor vehicle. 
The evidence that supports Kummer's conviction of driving under the influence of 
drugs to a degree that he was incapable of safely operating a vehicle includes Sergeant 
Taylor 's observations of Kummer's unsafe driving pattern, of his physical characteristics, 
of his performance on standard field sobriety tests, and of Kummer's admission that he 
had taken Soma and Lortab in combination, which Taylor knew to have an impairing 
effect. Kummer made a turn so wide that it crossed the outside of the outside lane as well 
as into the inside lane to a degree that it was partially in the painted island, in the center, 
straddling the line. (R.77 at 4-8). Sergeant Taylor also saw Kummer's vehicle weaving in 
and out of the inside lane over the center line into the painted island referred to as a turn 
lane. (R.77 at 8). 
When Sergeant Taylor approached Kummer he noticed Kummer's speech was 
rapid and somewhat raspy although Kummer normally speaks with a raspy voice. (R.77 at 
11). Sergeant Taylor noticed that Kummer had a hard time paying attention to what was 
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being requested of him, had a hard time keeping his eyes open, and his eyelids were 
droopy. (R.77-12). 
Sergeant Taylor had Kummer get out of his vehicle so he could administer field 
sobriety tests to him. (R.77 at 12). Sergeant Taylor testified during trial that he is a 
certified drug recognition expert through the Drug Evaluation classification Program 
sponsored by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (R.77 at 13). 
Prior to administering field sobriety tests to Kummer, Sergeant Taylor asked 
Kummer if he had any problems that would affect his ability to walk on a line in a 
prescribed manner, a straight line, and to stand on one foot. (R.77 19-20) Kummer told 
Sergeant Taylor that he had a spinal cord problem. (R.77 at 20). Sergeant Taylor asked 
Kummer if he would have a problem standing with his feet together and his hands by his 
side with his head back and his eyes closed. Kummer replied that he could do that. (R.77 
at 56). The tests were administered on a flat concrete sidewalk on a sunny day. (R.77 at 
24-25). 
Sergeant Taylor administered the Romberg balance test which consisted of having 
Kummer stand with his feet together, hands by his sides and head tilted back and eyes 
closed and estimate the passing of thirty seconds. (R.77 at 20-21). Sergeant Taylor 
testified that Kummer swayed six to eight inches circularly and front to back as well as 
side to side and that he estimated thirty seconds at eleven actual seconds that Sergeant 
Taylor timed on his watch. (R.77 at 22). Kummer's performance on the Romberg balance 
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test was poor. Sergeant Taylor felt that Kummer's balance was impaired and there was a 
definite problem with his perception of time. (R.77 at 22). 
Sergeant Taylor administered the modified finger-to-nose test to Kummer. (R.77 at 
23-24). Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer missed his nose, basically touching his 
face in different locations other than his nose on five of the six different attempts that he 
made. Kummer also was swaying during the administration of the test. (R.77 at 25). 
Sergeant Taylor administered two more field sobriety tests to Kummer, the hand 
slap and finger count test. (R.77 at 25-28). Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer failed 
the hand slap test by double and triple slapping on one side instead of slapping palm to 
back and not properly coordinating slapping with counting as he was instructed. (R.77 at 
26). Also, Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer failed the finger count test by not 
properly coordinating the touching of his fingers by his thumb when counting and he did 
not touch his fingers in proper sequences as instructed indicating a problem with his 
dexterity as well. (R.77 at 28). 
Sergeant Taylor also administered a horizontal gaze nystagmus test to Kummer 
and testified that Kummer failed this test and that all the clues were present indicating 
drug use. Taylor also testified that he observed nystagmus distinctly in both eyes, which 
was consistent with the use of Lortab and Soma which Kummer told Sergeant Taylor he 
had taken that morning.(R.77 at 28-30). 
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When Kummer was being transported to the Utah County jail, Sergeant Taylor 
testified that Kummer was "on the nod." Sergeant Taylor testified that during the 
administration of the field sobriety tests and in the car Kummer told him he had taken a 
legitimate prescription of Lortab and Soma at approximately 8:00 a.m. (R.77 at 34-35). 
Sergeant Taylor testified that Kummer's physiological condition was consistent 
with having taken both Lortab and Soma together. Sergeant Taylor testified that Lortab is 
a narcotic analgesic and pain killer that has central nervous system depressant effects. 
Lortab depresses the activity of the brain, of the central nervous system, causes people to 
slow down, appear asleep, appear tired, and has an analgesic effect which is a pain 
deadening effect. (R.77 at 36). Sergeant Taylor testified that if a person was to take a 
therapeutic dose of Lortab he may or may not be impaired, but the two drugs [Lortab and 
Soma] taken together will cause a compounding effect on a person's ability to divide his 
attention between a mental and physical task. The drugs will also affect a person's pulse, 
blood pressure, temperature, dexterity, and coordination, which all have an impact on 
driving and on slowing down a person's ability to react. (R.77 at 42). Sergeant Taylor 
testified that the duration of the compound effect of Lortab and Soma taken together is 
four to six hours and that this information was obtained from a Physicians Desk 
Reference and other medical and pharmacological texts. (R.77 at 53). 
Based on the total evidence presented at trial including Kummer's driving pattern, 
his talking rapidly, his admission to having taken both Soma and Lortab, his having 
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droopy eyelids, appearing tired, his hard time paying attention to Sergeant Taylor's 
requests, his inability to properly perform field sobriety tests administered to him, his 
impairment in simply standing, his impaired coordination, his impaired dexterity, and 
Sergeant Taylor's testimony as to the effect of Soma and Lortab, there was a sufficient 
quantum of evidence to support all the elements of driving under the influence of drugs to 
a degree that rendered Kummer incapable of safely operating a vehicle. There was 
sufficient evidence to support the trial court's verdict. 
i. Although Kummer has valid prescriptions for Lortab and Soma that is 
not a defense to the charge of driving under the influence. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44(2)(b) states the "[f]act that a person charged with 
violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a 
defense against any charge violating this section." 
Kummer testified that he took both Lortab and Soma on the morning of November 
5, 2002 at approximately 8:00 a.m. (R.77 at 35). He testified that he has a valid 
prescription for both drugs and has been taking them for ten years. (R.77 at 69). 
The evidence in this case showed and convinced the trial court that Kummer was 
under the influence of the compound effects of Lortab and Soma to a degree that rendered 
him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. Sergeant Taylor is a trained drug recognition 
expert (R.77 at 13, 40-42) who has been trained to recognize the compound effects of 
therapeutic doses of Lortab and Soma taken together (R.77 at 42) saw these effects in 
Kummer through his driving pattern, his rapid speech, his droopy eyelids, his appearing 
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tired, his difficulty paying attention to requests, his lack of being able to properly perform 
field sobriety tests administered to him, his impaired ability in simple standing, his 
impaired coordination, and his impaired dexterity. The quantum of the evidence taken 
together is sufficient to find Kummer guilty beyond a reasonable doubt 
ii. Kummer's nervous behavior was accompanied by other characteristics 
of being under the influence of drugs 
It is well settled in Utah case law that "nervous behavior when confronted by a 
police officer does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity Such 
nervous conduct is consistent with innocent as well as with criminal behavior." State v. 
Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992). 
It is reasonable to believe that Kummer was nervous and upset when he was pulled 
over by Sergeant Taylor, but when reviewing all of the other observations made by 
Sergeant Taylor it was also reasonable to believe that Kummer was under influence of 
drugs while operating his vehicle and that the unsatisfactory performance on field 
sobriety tests administered by Sergeant Taylor in addition to Kummer's acknowledgment 
that he had consumed a prescribed amount of Lortab and Soma that morning confirmed 
that Kummer was under the influence of drugs beyond a reasonable doubt. 
B. The defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance of counsel to Kummer 
Kummer asserts that he was denied ineffective assistance of counsel when his 
counsel failed to move for a dismissal of the driving under the influence charge. In order 
for Kummer to establish ineffective assistance of counsel Kummer "must [first] show that 
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his trial counsel's performance was deficient, in that it fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Once that is established, defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that the result would have been different absent the deficient performance.... 
Furthermore, in evaluating defense counsel's strategy under an ineffective-assistance 
analysis, we give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions and will not 
question such decisions unless there is not reasonable basis supporting them." State v. 
Bloomfield, 2003 UT App 3, \ 30, 63 P.3d 110. 
Kummer alleges that there was insufficient evidence as a matter of law to render a 
verdict rather than a dismissal. (Appellant's brief at 19). Kummer's defense counsel's 
performance was not deficient. Provo City presented sufficient evidence to prove each 
element of the crime of driving under the influence of drugs and the evidence was 
sufficient to sustain the trial court's verdict. Kummer's driving pattern, his talking 
rapidly, his admission to having taken both Soma and Lortab, his having droopy eyelids, 
appearing tired, his hard time paying attention to Sergeant Taylor's requests, his inability 
to properly perform field sobriety tests administered to him, his impairment in simply 
standing, his impaired coordination, his impaired dexterity, and Sergeant Taylor's 
testimony as to the effect of Soma and Lortab all taken together constitute sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's verdict. The trial court's verdict must therefore be 
sustained because it is not against the clear weight of the evidence. State v. Nichols, 2003 
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UT App 287, U 24,76 P.3d 1173 (quoting State v. Larsen, 2000 UT App. 106, f 10, 999 
P.2d 152). 
Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to show that Kummer was driving under 
the influence of drugs and Kummer's defense counsel was not deficient in not moving the 
trial court for dismissal of the charge for driving under the influence of drugs. 
Furthermore, because the trial court did find that there was sufficient evidence to convict 
Kummer of driving under the influence of drugs, the result of the trial court's verdict 
would not have been different even if Kummer's trial counsel had moved for dismissal of 
the charge. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Provo City asks this Court to affirm the trial court's 
verdict finding Kummer guilty of driving under the influence of drugs. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 2004. 
VERNON (RICK) ROMNEY X 7 
Counsel for Appellee / / 
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ADDENDUM 
Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 
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Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
Copyright (c) 2004 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. 
a member of the LexisNexis Group. 
All rights reserved. 
* * * STATUTES CURRENT THROUGH THE 2003 SECOND SPECIAL SESSION * * * 
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TITLE 41. MOTOR VEHICLES 
CHAPTER 6. TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS 
ARTICLE 5. DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS DRIVING 
• GO TO CODE ARCHIVE DIRECTORY FOR THIS JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (2003) 
§ 41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both or with 
specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — 
Criminal punishment — Arrest without warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of 
license 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "conviction" means any conviction for a violation of: 
(i) this section; ' 
(ii) alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving under 
Subsections (9) and (10); 
(iii) Section 41-6-44.6, driving with any measurable controlled substance that is taken 
illegally in the body;, 
(iv) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of 
both-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; 
(v) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or 
(vi) a violation described in Subsections ( l )(a)( i ) through (v), which judgment of 
conviction is reduced under Section 76-3-402; or 
(vii) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United States, or any district, 
possession, or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation of this section 
or alcohol, any drug, or a combination of both-related reckless driving if committed in this 
state, including punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec. 815; 
(b) "educational series" means an educational series obtained at a substance abuse 
program that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance 
with Section 62A-15-105; 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a substance abuse addiction and dependency 
screening and assessment obtained at a substance abuse program that is approved by the 
Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with Section 62A-15-105; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, 
or creates a substantial risk of death; 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treatment obtained at a substance abuse program 
that is approved by the Board of Substance Abuse and Mental Health in accordance with 
Section 62A-15-105; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means a state licensed substance abuse 
program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this 
section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that 
degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under like or 
similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle within this state 
if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the 
person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of the 
test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and 
any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the time of 
operation or actual physical control. 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled 
to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this section. 
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 100 
milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of 
alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of 
a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having 
operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at: the time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a passenger under 18 years of age in the 
vehicle at the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a third degree felony if 
the person has also inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of 
having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first conviction, impose a 
mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 48 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $ 700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the court may order probation for the 
person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or 
higher, the court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within ten years of a prior conviction 
under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program for not less than 240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-service work program, or home 
confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educational series if the court does not order 
substance abuse treatment as described under Subsection (5)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $ 800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance abuse treatment if the substance 
abuse treatment program determines that substance abuse treatment is appropriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in accordance with Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a third degree felony if it is: 
(i) a third or subsequent conviction under this section within ten years of two or more 
prior convictions; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; 
or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is committed after July 1, 2001. 
(b) Any conviction described in this Subsection (6) which judgment of conviction is reduced 
under Section 76-3-402 is a conviction for purposes of this section. 
(c) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court suspends the execution of a prison 
sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $ 1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 hours. 
(d) For Subsection (6)(a) or (c), the court shall impose an order requiring the person to 
obtain a screening and assessment and substance abuse treatment at a substance abuse 
treatment program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely 
supervised follow-through after treatment for not less than 240 hours. 
(e) In addition to the penalties required under Subsection (6)(c), if the court orders 
probation, the probation shall be supervised probation which may include requiring the 
person to participate in home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section may not be 
suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence 
imposed under this section has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a conviction 
for a violation under this section may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) that require a sentencing court to 
order a convicted person to: participate in a screening and assessment; and an educational 
series; obtain, in the discretion of the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, mandatorily, 
substance abuse treatment; or do a combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding screening and assessment, an 
educational series, or substance abuse treatment in connection with a first, second, or 
subsequent conviction under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the 
court would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent 
conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) The court shall notify the Driver License Division if a person fails to: 
(i) complete all court ordered: 
(A) screening and assessment; 
(B) educational series; 
(C) substance abuse treatment; and 
(D) hours of work in compensatory-service work program; or 
(ii) pay all fines and fees, including fees for restitution and treatment costs. Upon 
receiving the notification, the division shall suspend the person's driving privilege in 
accordance with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a charge of a 
violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43, or of Section 
41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this 
section, the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including 
whether or not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by 
the defendant in connection with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts that shows whether there was 
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection 
with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this 
Subsection (9)(b) of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of Section 41-6-
45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of each conviction of Section 41-6-
44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation of this section 
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation was committed by 
the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a person convicted for the first time 
under Subsection (2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person convicted of any subsequent offense 
under Subsection (2) or if the person has a prior conviction as defined under Subsection (1) 
if the violation is committed within a period of ten years from the date of the prior violation; 
and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as ordered by the court under Subsection 
(12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any suspension or revocation period the 
number of days for which a license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223 or 53-
3-231, if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record 
of conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this section, a court may order the 
operator's license of a person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to be 
suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 days, 180 days, one year, or two years 
to remove from the highways those persons who have shown they are safety hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license under this Subsection (12)(b), the 
court shall prepare and send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or revoke 
that person's driving privileges for a specified period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home confinement through the use of 
electronic monitoring, the electronic monitoring shall alert the appropriate corrections, 
probation monitoring agency, law enforcement units, or contract provider of the defendant's 
whereabouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other specified location of the person, so that 
the person's compliance with the court's order may be monitored; and 
(Hi) the person to pay the costs of the electronic monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate entity described in Subsection (13)(e) to place an 
electronic monitoring device on the person and install electronic monitoring equipment in the 
residence of the person or other specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home monitoring device to include a substance abuse 
testing instrument; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the person may consume during the time the person is 
subject to home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location conditions that allow the person to attend school 
educational classes, or employment and to travel directly between those activities and the 
person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associated with home confinement if the person is 
determined to be indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this section may either be administered directly 
by the appropriate corrections agency, probation monitoring agency, or by contract with a 
private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall cover the costs of waivers by the court under 
Subsection (13)(d)(iv). 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under Section 41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4)(e) or 
(5)(e): 
(i) the court shall specify the period of the probation; 
(ii) the person shall pay af( of the costs of the probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other conditions of the probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation described in this section by contract with a 
probation monitoring agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall monitor the person's 
compliance with all conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of probation, and court 
orders received under this article and shall notify the court of any failure to comply with or 
complete that sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of the costs associated with probation if the person 
is determined to be indigent by the court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in Subsection (14)(b) shall cover the costs of 
waivers by the court under Subsection (14)(d)(i). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) and there is admissible evidence 
that the person had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, then if the court does not order: 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection (4)(d), (5)(d), or (6)(d), then the court shall 
enter the reasons on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall enter the reasons on the record: 
(i) the installation of an ignition interlock system as a condition of probation for the 
person in accordance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement through the use of electronic monitoring in 
accordance with Subsection (13). 
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NOTES: 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1998 amendment by ch. 13, effective May 4, 1998, made minor 
stylistic changes throughout the section. 
The 1998 amendment by ch. 94, effective May 4, 1998, substituted "compensatory-
service" for "community-service" wherever it appeared in the section; and made a minor 
stylistic change in Subsection (6)(b) and (6)(c). 
The 1998 amendment by ch. 168, effective May 4, 1998, added Subsection ( l ) (b) , 
redesignating former Subsections ( l ) (b) and ( l )(c) as ( l)(c) and ( l ) (d ) ; redesignated 
